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Hawaiian A.nnexai ion. 
8 r E BCH 

OF 

1! ON. M A K ION I) E V B I ES, 

OF <■ A l. I PO B N I A. 

In the House op Representatives, 

l '.v. June 14, 1898. 

The House having under consideration the joint resolution ll Bi 
provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the Unite 1 S 

Mr. DE VRIES said: 

Mr. Speaker: The close of the nineteenth and the opening of 
the twentieth century witness a radical change in the theater of 
the chief commercial and naval operations of the world. 

The greater maritime commerce of the w< >rl<l is upon the Pacific. 
That boundless water early promises to be the scene of the great 
naval conflicts of the future. International conflicts almost in- 
variably arc the results of the straggles and sharp contests between 
nations in their endeavors to command the commerce of the world. 
The dismemberment of the Chinese Empire, the approaching com- 
pletion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the sudden appearance of 
Japan as a factor in the world's commerce and controversies, the 
development of Alaska and of the many islands of the Pacific and 
contiguous to the Orient have all attracted the genius, enter- 
prise, and capital of the world. 

Here is the world's mostexpansive field of commerce. Here arc 
unlimited possibilities for capital, labor, and genius. Hero is a 
boundless territory, inhabitedby over ."ioo.uii! i, not) people yet in com- 
parative primitiveness. From the world's scramble for advan- 
tages in the I Mient will come the conflicts of the next century. 
Here in the Pacific will arise the complications: here will be con- 
gregated the great navies, and here fought the great battles of 
the twentieth century. Already the European powers are divid- 
ing the advantages there obtainable. The part our country is 
destined to share in this development will be easily acquired and 
sustained if we act promptly and properly. 

With the "Key of the Pacific " and the Nicaragua ( 'anal ours, 
controlling and directing the com w of this commerce, at it- 

ern basis it will be controlled by the United States 1 'one, while at, 

us western basis it will be developed and divided by the combined 
energies and greed <>f Russia, England, Germany, France) Japan, 

and China. For our defense and COmmercia] advantage it be- 
hooves the Republic to marshal its forces, secure itself in its out- 
posts, and post its commercial agents for the coming struggle for 
this magnificent commerce and the possible wars of the future. 

Representing in part as I do the great State of California, with 
800 miles of coast line lying adjacent to the scenes of these activ- 
ities, I believe I foresee correctly for that State immense commer- 
cial advantages and a great future. The Pacific coast is destine.! 
to outrival the Atlantic: Seattle. Portland. San Francisco, San 
Diego, and Los Angeles will inevitably outrival Portland, Boston. 
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New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston. It was the 
commerce of the Atlantic that made great the latter; it will be the 
greater commerce of the Pacific that will make greater the former. 

California, with its millions of acres of fertile soil, its many 
rich mines, its infinite variety of productiveness, having every 
variety and character of land and climate, producing every variety 
and kind of produce, all in the infancy of their development, is 
destined by its contiguity to these new marts of the world and its 
relative position as the gateway of the world's future commerce, 
to become the richest country of the globe. The inevitable will 
bring to her farmers, her laborers, her manufacturers, demands of 
an infinite variety and quantity. Commerce is always reciprocal. 
Internal natural wealth and productiveness always respond to 
foreign trade, and the latter is essential to and develops the for- 
mer. 

As a great factor in the development of these resources and this 
commerce, as an impregnable defense thereof when developed, as 
well as of California's 800 miles of coast line, l shall vote for the 
annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. 

Believing as I do, and as I think can be conclusively demon- 
strated, that the ownership of these islands will render the Pacific 
coast perfectly impregnable from naval attack in case of war, I 
would consider the vote which failed to avail of their ownership 
inexcusable. To leave our great coast trade, our great coast 
cities, our many thousands of citizens subject to attack and de- 
struction by a hostile navy, to jeopardize its future by the possi- 
bility of such, when for the acceptance only, without the asking 
for these islands, it is possible to render all of these free of the 
possibility of such, would be little short of criminal. These con- 
siderations entail such grave consequences to the Pacific coast 
that they become national in importance. The debate upon this 
question discloses these to be moving factors in support of the 
] lending resolution. My reasons, therefore, in supporting the 
same, Avhile primarily local, are essentially national. 

PEART. HARBOR DEFENSELESS AND VALUELESS WITHOUT ANNEXATION— 
WITH ANNEXATION WE ABE IMPREGNABLE AGAINST NAVAL ATTACK ON 

THE W I - I 

Patient attention to this debate discloses that all the opponents 
of annexation admit the necessity of our Government having a 
coaling and supply station at Pearl Harbor in these islands, and 
they assert as a part of their argument that having this already, 
annexation adds nothing to our advantage or defense. 

There is no escape from the very patent fact that for military 
operations on the Pacific this station is imperatively necessary. 
'i be admission of this undeniable fact by the opponents of annexa- 
tion concedes the one point in the case fatal to their contention 
and which demonstrates annexation of Hawaii necessary to our 
defense. 

It is not necessary to rest the case of annexation upon the ques- 
tionable title we hold to that harbor. Our right thereto, as known 
to all, whs acquired by a treaty of reciprocity, wherein we granted 
Hawaii the right to export to the United States certain articles 
free of duty, and in return therefor she granted us the right we 
claim in Pearl Harbor. Before this treaty was concluded the Ha- 
waiian minister addressed a letter to the' then Secretary of State 
Bayard, inquiring if the interpretation of the treaty by our Gov- 
ernment was not that in case of revocation of the treaty we should 
surrender the harbor, to which the Secretary replied in the affirm- 



ative. Thereupon the treaty was concluded. The treat; ter- 
minable apon one year's nonce. 

At mi >st then, admitting the stability of present conditions, we 
have bul a precarious title to that aarbor, not one thai would 
justify its fortification, for certainly if the treaty is terminated 
our Government can no1 in honor insist upon holding the con- 
sideration therefor, especially as it was undoubtedly concluded 
with the contrary understanding. Waiving, however, this im- 
portant inquiry and further waiving the important question of 
whether or not under the treaty we have a right to anything more 
than the water Burface constituting the harbor and norighl to 
any adjacenl land for Bupply stores, shops, etc., weareconfi 
with an insurmountable objection winch, coupled with the ne- 
cessity of an impregnable harbor here, demonstrates annexation 
necessary. 

It i- admitted by everyone and on all Bides that Pearl Barbor is 
the only harbor in the Sandwich Islands thai can be made a naval 
stat Ion and base of supplies. 

We have heard much in the arguments by the opponents to an- 
nexation about fortifying th ; s harbor as a "t libra! tar." That is 
all thai is necessary, tiny say. That Bhould l»- done, they say; 
and for this reason annexation, they claim, is unnecessary. But 
the weakness of this argument lies in the tact that demonstrates 
annexation necessary, and that is thai Pearl Barbor can not be 
made a Gibraltar, can not be made impregnable, can not be in- 
vulnerably fortified without occupying Bonoluln and the wh »le 
of the Island of Oahu; and we can nol occupy these without an- 
nexing all tho Hawaiian Islands. It would be idle to talk of 
annexing the capital of Hawaii without annexing all the islands. 
No one would even suggest such an idea. 

The topography of the country is such and the situation such 
that to successfully fortify Pearl Harbor is a physical impossi- 
bility without occupying Honolulu. Pearl Harbor is atypical 
naval harbor. It is said by naval experts that it would he with- 
out a superior in the world if fortified from land attacks, which 

can b ■ easily and cheaply done. A coral re i protects its entrance 

without, so that no ship can enter save at a certain point upon 

which cm easily be trained modern guns that could defy the 
navies of the world. Through this v<;-[' the entrance of the har- 
bor winds through a narrow and deep channel to a 'hep hay on 

the interior large enough to accommodate all the navies of the 

earth. It is just seven miles from the channel entering Pearl 
Harbor proper to Honolulu, To the west of a line between M 
lulu and Pearl Harbor is a hill, Leitono, 185 feet high. This hill 
is susceptible of being cheaply and impregnably fortifii d by mi d 
ern guns, which would at once command Pearl 1 1 irbor and Hono- 
lulu and could destroy with impunity every ship or man-of-war 

attempting to enter tiiis barb ir and demolish that city. 

Baca of Honolulu, ami within three-quarters of a mile of Hono- 
lulu Harbor, stands another hill called the "Punch Howl." ;'.>-- 
feet high, likewise buso ptible of being cheaply and impregnably 
fortified, and from which modern guns could destroy any ship or 
war vessel entering or departing from Pearl Harbor. Northeast 
from Honolulu. ■!'• miles, m a thud h 11 Diamond 11' ad :<\\ feet 
high, likewise Busceptible of fortification and commanding the 
harbor and city of Honolulu and adjacent coast. Each of these 
hills is approachc l by almost perpendicular walls. Back of all 
these hills is a mountain range the only pa which is a nar- 



row defile about 20 feet wide, of over 1,200 feet elevation, and this 
is the only pass from the west by which Pearl Harbor or Honolulu 
can be approached. The sides of the mountain are almost perpen- 
dicular for a thousand feet. A few men at this pass could hold it 
against thousands. It is a veritable Thermopylae. Military experts 
agree that for a nominal expense, less than the cost of one battle 
ship, all these points can be so fortified that the navies of the world 
could not enter Pearl or Honolulu harbor nor could the armies 
of the world assault these by land. Here is the much-desired 
'•Gibraltar," defended by an equally desirable "Thermopylae." 
It will not be contended, however, that we acquired Honolulu by 
the reciprocity treaty, yet without it Pearl Harbor will afford 
no refuge for our war ships, for they could be bombarded from 
Honolulu or any of the points named. The Island of Oahu, upon 
which is situated the capital of Hawaii, can for a comparatively 
nominal sum be made a Gibraltar and a Thermopylae. Without 
all of this island Pearl Harbor is defenseless and useless. But 
Oahu can only be acquired by annexing Hawaii. 

The inevitable induction, then, from the admission of the neces- 
sity of a coaling and repairing station and harbor at Pearl Har- 
bor is the annexation of all of these islands. 

No one has given more careful study to the strategic value and 
possibilities of Hawaii and the detailed necessities to make it such 
than Lieut. Lucien Young. He was an attache of the Boston, 
stationed at Honolulu at the time of the revolution. He com- 
manded the United States artillery landed at that time for the 
protection of American interests. During the long stay there he 
made a careful study of the country, distances, etc. His report, 
forbidden publication by the Cleveland Administration, is now 
published by him in book form. It should be read by all students 
of this great question. In part he says: 

A SELF-EVIDENT PROPOSITION. 

The importance of Hawaii as a strategical position is no more a matter of 
opinion than is a geometrical axiom. It is a primal, incontrovertible fact. 
It is second in importance to no other single point on the earth's surface. 
England seized, and with luilldog tenacity has held, Gibraltar for its stra- 
tegical value alone; but there is no country tho route to which lies past Gi- 
braltar which <an not be reached by several other different ways. The dis- 
tinctive feature of Hawaii, wherein it is unique among the strategical points 
of the world, is that it lies at the center of an area so great that commercial 
and military operations across it are practically impossible except by using 
Hawaii as a coal and supply station. Eliminate Hawaii from tho man. and 
there are BCarcely any battle ships in existence which can operate across the 
Pacifio, by reason of the fact that they can not carry coal enough, and the 
problem of coaling at sea has not yet been solved. 

It has been repeatedly and officially pointed out by the naval authorities, 
not only of the United States but of the world that the trans-Pacific coun- 
t ries and islands, with the exception of Hawaii, are so far distant from the 
American continent that unless tin ships of such nations can recoal at 
Hawaii it is practically impossible for them to get to the Pacific coast for the 
purpose of conducting military operations there. The most efficient ships 
could not get thereat all. and thoso which do carry sufficient coal to cross 
would have no coal with which to operate, much less to return to their base 
rations, iii other words, it is impossible to maintain naval or military 
operations at a distance of from 3,500 to 5,500 miles from a base of operations. 
Under these c editions it is elementary strategy and logic that there can be 
no surer defense to the Pacific coast of the United States than to prevent 
any other foreign country from getting possession or control of Hawaii. 
THE QUESTION OF DEFENSE. 

Notwithstanding the certainty of the defense which would be afforded to 

, dflc coast by excluding a possible enemy from Hawaii, it would not 

icy for the United States to attempt this method of defense by herself 

taking possession of Hawaii, unless that possession could be made effective 

a1 reasonable exp 

Whether this can be done is nota new question to American naval author- 
ities or statesmen. 



As longago as 1861 Congress, by f omul resolution >■• ■ ftvry 

ana War Departn port upon the conditions and requirei 

the coas dcfensesol the L'l By Instr . 

partment Admiral Dupont drew up ■ report in reply to thin i 
winch be said, In connection with thodefense of the Pa 

" ',' ls [mppssJl .••• to,, highly the vain,, an. I Importance of the 

(sandwich islands, whether in a commercial or military point of view Hbould 
cireni r pla ■ • them in our hands, they would prove the n 

■t acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific < >ccan nn acquisition 
intimately connected w th our commercial and naval supremacy n those 

• 

This opinion basbeen fullyapproved by tji 
that day to this, I hat I nltei ontrolof Bawail can ■ 

effective and economical is demonstrated by a oriel 

I i w BECUR] P( 

Although th,' Hawaiian Islands are eight in number and extei i 

tanceof about i dies, with the exceptions ol Honolulu and Pearl harbors 

it- porta are a 1 - • i •< ■ » i roadsteads, in which vessels are comi it .lis 

tances pi approximately half a mile from shore, obliged at all times to land 
.•mil Bhipall freight In small boats, hampered by the restless Bwell of the 

1 anandexposed to constant interruptions The port ol n 

could !»• partially protected by building a breakwater several miles Ions n: 
an .■xj„Mis,. ,.t an auestimated number of millions ol dollars, l.ut even then it 
would not be protected from northerly storms With the exception there 

: l! '"In and Pearl harbors, all other points in th.' islands may bo 

eliminated from consideration as possible naval stations. 

Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbor are both located upon the -.nth -,,1,. 
island ol Oahmand are only! miles apart. Any effective military 

control of ti ne nm-t necessarily include th.- control of ti ther f..r they 

together that heavy artillery located ■■<: either point w 
withm easy range and have mil oontrol of the other. 
Fprtiflcations for the defense ol the two need be 
Kind. Both Honolulu and Pearl harbors are prot< '•(•■. 1 by natural fortiflcn 

tions, which l nothing but th.. placing of the guns to become impregna- 

rnree miles east ol Honolnl i fout int.) the deep wni 

summit only aboui a quarter of a mil., from th.. water - • > . mond 

Head.a lull ..i -.lid rock, with an almost perpendicular face, read 
ition <>f 750 I 

NATfl! W. Ki'HI 11 I. \ I los- 

In th.- very heart ..f Honolulu, with three-quarters of a mile of deep 
ios a second hill of solid rock, with almost perpendicular face. ri.Mii • 
elevation ol ..'«i feet. Four miles weal of Honolulu , p oa rl 

Harbor, lies a thu-.l lull .■! th.- -am.' rocky, perpendicular character, reaching 

an elevation oM ittery of modern guns can be mounted . 

■ •I these three hills at so little expense as to practically eliminate the amount 
a- a factor i..r consideration a- an estimate of cost To th.' rear ol Honolulu 
th.' only pass through th.' mountain i- a narrow cnt.SU feet wide tonpi 
which an invading army would have to climb an aim dicnlar LlufT 

nearly 1,000 i".-t high, which would preclude any attack from tb . 

Honolulu w an absolut ndlocked harbor, but i- unsuitable for 

a naval station lor tw.. reasons: Fii It is s.. small that it will not 

modate more than 100 vessels at the outside, and the rapidly gr 
commercial use ..f the port will very soon tax its limit to t 1 iu the 

8 "l'l place, th.' shores of th" barb >r are distant only from a l 

quarters ol a mil.- fr deep water. Th.' dry docks, machim 

■ es ■■: a naval station should 1>" to 
water as to practically put them beyond th.' reach of an , rdinary bombard 
in. 'in. while Honolulu can be so fortified as to absolute!? 
live landing being made, it lit it a heavy 

ship might easily, before boingdrivi 
station by a few well dir 

Pearl Harbor is an arm of tl onected with thi 

long, narrow, river like entrance, Boni9 :; miles in length, the h 
pandmg and dividing into three lochs, having • interior froi 

of some 80 miles, witn an average depth of from HO to 60 feet II 
formed ol coral and sandstone, with a top layer of soil. In ma:.-. 
banks are so perpendicular that a full rigged ship could lie alongside « 
excavation or flock building. 1 harbor is surrounded by abui 

springs ol pure, fresh water, and artesian wells reach fresh w 
point at a depth of approximately t" > to us f,.,.f. which ri-.'s to an el< 
piabout i level. Th< i well wooded with algi 

forests and the country on the land -id.' is a rich, fertile disti I 

with rice, banana, and sugar plantations, 
amount of fresh supplies tion. 

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A CONVENIENT REEF. 

A barrier reef extends parallel with and distant About a mile from the 
shore, and the water beyond does not reach a depth of over 100 feet for a dis- 
tance of about another mile, being well suited, therefore, for marine mining. 
These, with the assistance of the fortifications already spoken of and inex- 
pensive fortifications at the month of the harbor, would be absolutely pro- 
hibitive of any successful attack upon the station from the sea. The Navy 
and War Departments have already executed most minute surveys of the 
harbor and its entrance, and caused expert reports to be made thereon. As 
early as 1872 Generals Schofield and Alexander, of the United States Army, 
reported unequivocally in favor of the military value of this harbor to the 
United States. , 

The survevs of the Navy Department have been made under the direction 
of Admirals Irwin, Walker, and Miller. They disclose that there is a sand 
bar across the extreme outer entrance of the harbor, consisting almost ex- 
clusively of soft, disintegrated coral sand, which can be disposed of by a suc- 
tion dredge at an estimated expense of not to exceed $150,000. The rise and 
fall of the tide is less than 3 feet, and there are no currents which need bo 
feared to reform the bar. A bar similar in character, somewhat smaller in 
extent, was pumped out from the entrance to Honolulu Harbor in 1891. a depth 
of over 30 feet being secured, which has not since changed a particle. The 
expense of clearing the Honolulu Harbor bar, exclusive of the cost of the 
dredge, was only about $40,000. This dredge is the propertyof the Hawaiian 
Government, and is available at any time for use by the United States Gov- 
ernment at Pearl Harbor if desired. 

TREATY RIGHTS. 

The United States now has by the treaty the right to the exclusive use of 
Pearl Harbor, but has as yet taken no step other than making the surveys 
mentioned to avail itself of this privilege. A popular view has been that 
t ue rights which the United States possesses in Pearl Harbor are all that the 
United States needs in a military way. This is an erroneous view. In the 
iirst place, there are doubts as to the permanency of the title of the United 
States to the harbor. The Hawaiian Government, both the monarchy and 
the republic, maintains that the United States title to the harbor is co- 
terminus with the existing reciprocity treaty, and that if such treaty is ter- 
minated the American rights to Pearl Harbor terminate also. 

Be that as it may, there is no grant of territory by that treaty, and as a 
protective measure it would be necessary for the United States to own not 
only the hind on which its naval station is located, but it should be able to 
control the territory for a sufficient distance away therefrom to insure the 
nonoccupation of a hostile power. The report of Generals Schofield and Alex- 
ander in ls^ laid especial stress upon this point. At that time, basing their 
opinion upon the then efficient range of cannon, they reported that the united 
States should secure territory for a distance of not less than i miles in every 
direction from the harbor. Since then the efficient range of heavy artillery 
has greatly increased. Honolulu lies only 7 miles from Pearl Harbor, well 
within range. 

Thero certainly can be no claim advanced that by the reciprocity treaty, 
which gives the United States the authority to establish a naval station at 
Pearl Harbor, it was intended to cede to the United States the jurisdiction 
i >ver the territory occupied by Honolulu, the capital city of the country, and 
yet without possession or control of Honolulu thero is no safety in locating a 
naval station at Pearl Harbor. The necessary corollary of this situation is 
that in order to make use of Pearl Harbor the control of Honolulu must also 
raired. 

A DEFINITE ALTERNATIVE. 

It is not within the bounds of consideration that the people of Hawaii 
would consent 1 1 1 segregate the city of Honolulu from the country and trans- 
fer it to the United States. The proposition which the United States must 
then face is to take the islands as a whole, or Pearl Harbor is of no value to it. 
In other words, the question is reduced down to the single issue of annexing 
- .up as a whole or letting it go as a whole. Another matter of vital 
importance in arriving at a decision of this issue is the certainty that it will 
be almost impossible to eject any strong maritime power which once in- 
treni hes itself in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. 

On the other hand, if the United States first occupies this stronghold of 

D World, it will give it the dominant power over the entire North 

Pacific, both from a naval and a commercial standpoint, ami afford a military 

protection to its Pacific coast and a control over the trans-Pacific commerce 

which can be attained in no other way. 

If any or the leading maritimo nations obtain that control, they can be 
evicted therefrom only by such expenditure of blood and treasure as will 
make the effort one of the great naval and military feats of history; and, 
until such eviction, it will be the ouo focus in the northern Pacific from 



whicu hostile 1 1 1 i I i * . ■ >. 

commerce, now greater in the Pacific than iu ai 
1 rom nit t he face i J i he 
That 1 should make no mi-take In distances, which 

vi' <>i" niB argument, l have verified the same from the « «n i 
rial l [awaiian map in tli" archives ol th< 
veyand Found them absolutelj ■ elf shows L i 

tenant Young to have been a close student of this questio 
others speaking of the question and in this debate vary in their 
statements on the points of these distances. There is no wu 
betwe< ii Lieutenant Youngs statement and the official sm ■ 

With these islands a part of our dominion, im] i 
tied, as they are capable of being, the Pacific coast would • 
complete immunity from Bea attack. 

No warcrafl existing «>r known to the world can 'airy sufficient 
coal to cross tii" Pacific and operate against our coast and n 
indeed, none such can ever cross and return by reason of ti ■ 
that sufficient coal can nol be carried for that purpose. There 

are i ther islands in the Pacific that will fulfill such pui ; 

Acquiring I lands, therefore, means a complete natural 

defense of the Pacific coast Nothing ihort of annexation will, 
however, make this defense compli 

The converse is equally true, as Btated by Lieutenant Young. 
Should an enemy acquire them and operate therefrom 
of supplies, no power on earth could dislodge this enemy, who, 
operating therefrom as a base of supplies and opei »n tii<? 

great commerce and cities of the Pacific coast, would ■ 
mediable disaster. We could possibly, by appropriating thou- 
Bandsof millions of dollars therefor, fortify every point on that 
coast, but we could not with Unit fully protect our 
from Buch attack even with a mighty navy added; for the attack- 
ing party always gathers its force t" a known point, wb 
part v attacked ii iver knows where tin- blow is to )"■ -ti nek. 

With Bawaii fortified, therefore, we have an outpost inipn 
Me to all attack and from Which our Navy can Bweep the Pai ific. 

og iii the rear any fleet attempting an assault tip 
coast, attacking at a distance any Buch, and rendering helph 
denial of coal supplies any enemy approachio 

With Hawaii, th< refore, we will !»• ma •• Pacific 

manding and protecting at once Alaska, the P ad the 

eastern terminus of the Nicaragua < 'anal. 

< ;. ntlemen have suggested a coaling Btation at [Jnalaska. 
Bide of the incontrovertible argument that this i 
lor sufficient reasons by navigators, the necessit) wh 
the acquisition of the Qnalaska »n equallj 

argues the necessity tor the acquisition of the . nly ot 
cable coaling station in the Pacific, Hawaii, whicl 
of defense of incalculable value. 

It Bhould he borne in mind t! thechief 

of Hawaii will be th< I of the western entra 

ragua Canal when c I. To this point Hawaii is almost 

•j. I miles nearer than Ohalaska. Promacommei dpoint 

all vessels bound from the Orient ild bo 

compelled to call at Hawaii for BUpplies. Certainly n 
would go 3,016 miles farther north for Buch to Dhalaska. 

No words can so forcibly illustrate th< sb andcomm< 

value of Hawaii to the United - the map. showing in miles 

the relative position there >f in the Pacific, which I wdl hi i' 
as a part of my consideration of this question. 



9 

ANN] \ \ 1 1"N ID UTS A UCALLBB A!tM V AM" s vvv 

With this impregnable barb >r commanding our w e st e rn coast, 
capable of accommodating our entire Navy, and which < an l » » 
defended against the navies and armies of the world without tip- 
use of a single battle Bhip by the manning of fortifications on 
land, we have minimized the cost of future Pacific coasl defense. 
Instead of annexation requiring an additional navy t > defend 
these islands, these islands will, when necessary, defend the Navy. 

Our possession of them, properly fortified and need as a b 
supplies for our ships, while rendering the Pacific i from 

attack, will at the same time decrease the requirements of a strong 
navy to defend every point of that coast. Especially i-> this true 
should the islands come into p issession of a hostile country. The 
topograph)' of the country will enable us by modern fortifications, 
with the service of local militia and volunl sers, to hold it against 
all hostile corners. 

Annexation, therefore, means economy, means a smaller navy, 
means a smaller army to render impregnable our \ 

Tins vn.w BTTPPORTKD nv ALL naval am> mii 

Not only is the strategic value of Hawaii asserted and the a 
ability of annexation supported by the facts and opinions cited, 
but also by an unbroken Line and unanimity of opinion of "ur 
naval and military experts. We educate many of these gentlemen 
at public expense in order to avail our country of their technical 
knowledge; we commit to their knowledge and judgment in tlm > 
of war the lives of our citizens, our property, and our country. 
From their ranks spring such men as Dewey and Hobson, whose 
genius and bravery excite the applause of the world and command 
the expressed admiration of the enemy. Their opinions, there- 
fore, in matters environed by conditions calling for such should 
be accepted by us as conclusive. At least this must be true when 
these opinions are rcen forced by the criterion of pi mmon 

sense, 

The following are a few of the many of this ord IT of merit. 

An English authority, the London Tim 

The narrow, land-locked Inlet or lagoon named Pearl River Harbor la In 
itself small m extent, lmt it is ">f inestimable valo< 
possessing it and nsm^ it for naval purposes. In the deep w 
sheltered lake not only the armed >lui"-. of the ' conn- 

tries may tiii'1 peace and perfect security. The maritime power which holds 
Pearl Ettver Harbor and moors her fleet there b N'ortH 

Pacific. 

George W. Melville, Chief Engineer of the ; Navy, 

one of we recognized leading naval engineers of the a 
cently written upon this question as f"llows: 

ICODKRH WAII I IKi: A Tllll'.l' IN ■ ' 

It is true that we are whOIl] 
the United States desires no rritory. but j In the 

full matnten rights with Eastern peoples, there 

to I"- ii" probable cause !••;■ ■ clash N ■ 

"thief In the night .viftly and without warning. Jomlni.a 

of strategy, has said, " No enemy is so in 
looted i>v any power, however Cormidal 

A wis,- state should apply the same re i • "• he 

Bays, "Iron weighs at least as much as g >ld i I 

an answer wholly apt t > the argument of th "•• who, calm in the coi 
present peace, would rely up <n the ansi tlth of the 

States and our limitless ] imeetthest idden war. l 

bering the "gold " only, and forgetting the vital "iron" of militai 
HAWAII BBIDOBS A BS v 0THBBWI8S DfPASSABLB. 

Anil so while at this time we are wholly at peace on tl 
breadth of that wide ocean lies between us aud the at I 



10 

may si ime time be hostile to us, yet it must be remembered that in a moment 
peace may fade and that Hawaii bridges the stretch of sea which without the 
island group would be at this stage in the development of marine propulsion 
impassable to an enemy's fleet. 

PEARL HARBOR THE KEY TO WESTERN DEFENSE. 

Pearl Harbor is the sole key to the full defense of our western shore, and 
that key should lie in our grasp only. 

WHY HAWAII ISA STRATEGIC POINT AND MADEIRA NOT. 

Hawaii's unique advantages as a strategic point of prime importance have 
been set forth so ably and so often as to forbid their citation here. One or 
two objections raised by not a few nontechnical critics may, however, be 
considered. 

Pearl Harbor is 2,100 miles from our western coast, and Madeira is about 
the same distance from our eastern shore. The latter has little, if any. mili- 
tary value. Why. then, should Hawaii, parted by the same stretch of sea, 
exceed it in importance? 

PACIFIC SO BROAD WAR SHIPS MUST RECOAL AT HAWAII. 

The critics forget that the paramount worth of the Hawaiian group in war 
will lie, first, in the fact that the Pacific is so broad that its passage will 
exhaust the coal supply of a war vessel, making necessary a renewal at Hon- 
olulu; and, second, in the isolation of the group, with the absence of other 
la ml between it and our coast. If the Pacific were as narrow as the Atlantic, 
or if other islands intervened— as with Madeira— between our western shore 
and Hawaii, the strategic value of the latter would be largely reduced. 

PEARL HARBOR IMPREGNABLE. 

Again, it has been urged that if we shall take the group we shall but 
acquire territory to defend— an element not of strength, but of weakness, in 
war. and one which will make necessary large additions to our fleet. Pearl 
Harbor can be made an impregnable ocean fortress. It is true that one does 
not wage war with fortresses. It is also true, however, that they form vant- 
age points from which a force may sally and under whose wing that force 
may supply and recruit for fresh attack. If Hawaii in naval conflict shall 
have no useful function in this, then it would seem that, through the wars of 
all time, the eager strife for the possession of for tresses, of guarded ports, of 
frontier outposts, has been false strategy, an error militarily. 

ENEMY ATTACKING WESTERN COAST MUST FIRST CONTROL HAWAII. 

As to the dread of the economist or of the altrurian, that annexation will 
require largely augmented naval strength, it may be said that if an adequate 
force of the united States be stationed at Hawaii and its coast communica 
tions be properly guarded, an enemy from over sea would violate some of 
tin- cardinal principles of naval strategy and invite sure disaster in attacking 
our western Bhores without first blockading or defeating the Hawaiian 
squadron. The force of Pearl Harbor should then form simply but the first 
line of defense. Then the seagoing ships "fit to lie in a line," with their tor- 
pedo auxiliaries should be gathered to meet first the assault, leaving the coast 
guard to the reserve of torpedo craft and monitors stationed at fortified 
ports. The strength of the squadron a* this mid-Pacific outpost should be, 
doubtless, sufficient to meet the enemy, but the force on the coast could bo 
reduced. 

Captain Mahan, whose writings upon naval science are of such 
merit as to have been translated into many foreign languages, has 
written as follows upon this subject: 

It is one of the most important strategic points in the world. It stands 
alone, having no rival and admitting no rival. It istheone spot in the Pacific 
In, ni tin- equator on the south to Alaska on the north, and between America 
on the cast and Asia on the west, where water, food, or coal can be obtained. 
It is also on or near the principal trade routes across the Pacific. Its unique 
position is what has given it the name of the "crossroads'' of the Pacific, 
the "key of the Pacific," the "Gibraltar of the Pacific." 

Till: POSSESSION OF HAWAII WILL STRENGTHEN THE UNITED STATES. 

1. From a military point of view the possession of Hawaii will strengthen 
the United States. Of course, as is constantly argued, every addition of ter- 
ritory is an additional exposed point; but Hawaii is now exposed to pass 
under foreign domination— notably Japan— by a peaceful process of over- 
running and assimilation. This will inevitably involve its possession by a 
foreign power a grave military danger to us— against which preoccupation 
by the United States is, in my judgment, the only security. 

A LARGER NAVY Mi. BSSABY WITHOUT THAN WITH HAWAII. 

:.'. In replying to the second question I must guard myself from being 
understood to think our present Pacific fleet great enough for probable con- 
3537 



11 

tingencies, Willi Luis imoi istlwi n greater amy would not be n led for 

the defense of the P ' khan would be required with the Islands un- 

annexed. If wo have the Islands, and in the Pacific a Heel of proper force, 
tho presence of the latter, <>r of an adequate detachment from it. at the 
Hawaiian Islands will materially woaken if not wholly cripple an] attempted 
Invasion of the Pacific ooast (except from British Columbia), and 
quently will proportionately strengthen us. 

With a 11. -ft < .r the same si/.o. and Hawaii unoccupied by either party, tho 
enemy would at. least be hi a better position to attach us; while if he suc- 
ceeded In establishing himself In any of our ooast anchorages, he would l>o 
far better off. For In the latter case the Islands would n..i menace his com- 
munications with home, which they would If In our poaa ■ ohm, because Ha 
wail Hanks the communications. 

It Ls obvious also that Ifwedonot hold the islands ourselves we cannot 
exped the nentrals In the war to prevent the other belligerent from occupy 
.11. nor can t be Inhabitants themselves prevent Bucta i. Tho 

commercial value Is not great enough to provoke neutral Interposition. In 
short, in war we should need a larger navy t.. defend the Pacific coast, be- 
cause we should have not only to defend our own coast, but to prevent, by 
naval force, an enemy from occupying the islands: whereas, if we had pre- 
occupied them, fortifications could preserve them to us. 

COAi.tN.; A I BBA IMi'ii v. tii IAB1 i:. 

•i. Coal can be transported hi colliers, but as yet it can not be transsl 

Aith either rapidity or certainty. Even If it be occasionally pra. tlca- 

iii.. t :ii at sea, the process is si. .wand uncertain. Reliance upon such 

means only is. In my Judgment, Impassible. A base must i>.> had. and. .-x.-.-pt, 

the ports of our own coast, there is none to be nam.' 1 alongside Of Hawaii. 

Admiral Porter, in an official report with reference to Hawaii, 
states: 

European commerce, customs, enterprise, and ideas of government are 

making rapid strid.-s all over that vast an | l'.i iiflc , a t neater on which 

nal lire Beems to have intended the United States should exereise the princi- 
pal a infcroL 

And ho deprecates the occupancy of those islands by any other 
power as follows: 

They could launch forth their ships of war upon us with perfect impunity, 
* * * andin the event of war we should be driven from the Pacific. * * • 
Every consideration points to the absolute nee — Ity of obtaining for the 
United states a paramount Influence thoi-e. 

Admiral Du Pont has also officially reported in language similar 
upon tho necessity of these islands as a natural Pacific coast de- 
fense: 

In tho Pacific we already have outposts on our flanks In the hands of first- 
owera It is Imp esible to estimate too highly the value and Impor- 
i ince it t tie Sandwich Islands, whether In a commercial or military point of 
view, should circumstances ever place them In our hands, they would pn <ve 
the most Important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific I > 
acquisition intimately connected with our commercial and naval Bupi 
in those seas. 

And Admiral Belknap Btates: 

an.M'.xation 01 KOXXRTOUfl DTTXBB8T am> VITAL IHPOBTAJ 

To the people of the United Stat • 
interest and of vital imp >rta:ve. fad I. it would seem that i . 

tablished that group to be ultimately occupied as an outpost,aa it v 
the great Republic on Its western border and that the tune had no.. 
for the fulfillment ofsuch de 

A glance at a chart of the Pacific will indicate to the most casual oh 
the great Importance and Inestimable value of those Islands as a strategic 
point and commercial center. Bituated in mid North Pacific, the group looks 
out on every hand toward grand opportunities of trade, political aggrandize- 
ment, and polyglot intei * • 

The group now seeks annexation to the United States; the consummation 
of such wish would inure to the benefit of both peoples, commercially and 
politically. Annex the islands, constitute them a Territory, ai 
trade will double within ten yean. Let the islanders feel that they are once 
and forever under the folds of the American Bag, as part and parcel of tlej 
great Republic, and a development will take place in the group that will at 
oucesurprise its people and the world. 



12 

FAILURE TO ANNEX WOULD BE FOLLY. 

Not to take the fruit within our grasp and annex the group now begging 
ns to take it in would be folly, indeed— a mistake of the gravest character. 
Loth for the statesmen of the day and for the men among us of high com- 
mercial aims and great enterprises. 

Our statesmen should act in this matter in the spirit and resolve that 
secured to us the vast Louisiana purchase, the annexation of Texas, and the 
acquisition of California. The Administration that secures to the United 
Stales the "coign of vantage" in the possession of those beautiful islands 
will score a great measure of beneficent achievement to the credit side of its 
account. * * * 

To which may he added contributions from the pen of that in- 
valuable contributor to military science, General Schofield: 

From the time, twenty-five years ago, when I made a personal examination 
for the purpose of ascertaining the value of those islands to this country for 
military and naval purposes, I have always regarded ultimate annexation of 
the islands to this country as a public necessity. But the time when this 
should lie accomplished had to depend on natural political development. In 
t In- 1 1 leantime our national interests should be secured by the exclusive right 
to occupy, improve, and fortify Pearl River Harbor, so as to insure our pos- 
session of that harbor in time of war. 

PEARL HARBOR MUST BE HELD AT ANY COST. 

To illustrate my views on this subject, I have likened that harbor to a 
commanding position in front of a defensive line which an army in the field 
is compelled to occupy. The army must occupy that advanced position and 
hold it, at whatever cost, or else the enemy will occupy it with his artillery, 
and thus dominate the main line. If we do not occupy and fortify Pearl 
River Harbor, our enemy will occupy it as a base from which to conduct op- 
erations against our Pacific coast and the isthmian canal, which must, of 
course, in due time, be constructed and controlled by this country. The 
possession of such a base at a convenient distance from our Pacific coast 
would be a great temptation to an unfriendly nation to undertake hostile op- 
erations against us. 

PEARL HARBOR CAN BE DEFENDED WITHOUT A NAVY. 

One of the greatest advantages of Pearl River Harbor to us consists in the 
fact that no navy would be required to defend it. It is a deep, landlocked 
arm of the sea, easily defended by fortifications placed near its mouth, with 
its anchorage beyond the reach of guns from the ocean. 

No hallway measures will suffice. We must accept the islands and hold 
and govern them or else let some other great nation do it. To fail now to 
carry intoeffect oar own great national policy upon the first occasion offered 
to us W( iuld, in my judgment, be one of those blunders which are worse than 
crimes. 

It would be idle to multiply opinions upon this subject or to at- 
tempt to add to the value, weight, or conviction borne by those 
already cited. 

It seems to me, therefore, that the advisability of annexation 
from a strategic standpoint is not only established by the logic of 
the situation and the opinions of those entitled to be given weight, 
but is a geometrical axiom capable of absolute demonstration. 

THE II II id. POLITICAL STATUS OF HAWAII. A PROTECTORATE, AND THE 
MINORITY REPORT. 

Wisdom in legislation, particularly in matters of great national 
concern, involving the possibility of the national defense, requires 
that every apparent possible contingency be provided against. 
The occasion having arisen when this Government is called upon 
to finally adopt a course with reference to this question, at this 
la^t opportunity this Congress should not leave the country ex- 
posed to any subsequent embarrassment. 

It will be conceded by all that Hawaii is incapable of independ- 
ent existence. Of small area and population, of limited wealth 
and revenues, without any navy or army, she is incapable, in 
times of foreign or domestic complications, which confront every 
government from time to time, of maintaining an independent 
sovereignty. More particularly is this true as her strategic posi- 



13 

tion in tho Pacific makes her the object of the jealousies of other 
nations and consequent subject of controver 

it has. therefore, been tho history of these islands thai they 
have been tossed about from one domination to another, foreign 
and domestic. All of its governments have Bought the strong 
arm Mt" some foreignpower npon which to lean their precarious 
political existence. Four times in the past eighty-four years had 
she been taken possession of — once by Russia, twice by Franco, 
and once by England. In the past Ihu- quasi-political identity 
has b ten preserved solely by the moral .support given thai 
ence by this Government. 

It is idle to multiply arguments upon this proposition, however, 
for the argument is foreclosed by the minority report upon this 
resolution, which asserts the necessity of a quasi protectorate over 
these islands by this Government. 

For my part I am unable to appreciate either the cogency of tho 
logic or the consistency of the opposition here that asserts at once 
that the people of these islands are a Bavage, ignorant, leprous, 
and undesirable population and at the same time demands that 
we become by a protectorate responsible for their conduct with all 
nations without having the right to control their actions. If their 
C mdition is as stated, nothing short of annexation can justify any 
assumption of responsibility for that people bv us. 

While the moral support of this country has Bufficed in the 
premises in the past, wo are now confronted by new conditions 
demanding different treatment. 

In the progress of the century these islands have increased in 
importance. The lethargy of the Pacific is disturbed by a rapidly 
increasing commerce, lis quiet is viewing the gradual assembling 
hereof the great navies of the world. To the west with gigantic 
strides Japan is suddenly thrust into the horizon, ambitious, p »w- 
erful, grasping. Activity will supplant the quietude of the Pa- 
cific. 

Local conditions in Hawaii have changed. A Republic has sup- 
planted a monarchy, a Republic whose principles and govern- 
ment are similar to ours and whoso creation and perpetuity were 
and are manifestly contingent upon absorption within and annexa- 
tion to our Government. A silent but dreadful enemy is pi 
in a majority population, under any general franchise, of Japan- 
ese who demand and whose country demands for them political 
liberty in Hawaii, tho right to participate in the law and treaty- 
making power, without renouncing their allegianc 1 to their native 
Japan. Japan has covel tus eyes upon Hawaii and will take her 
at the first opportunity, by peace it' possible, by force if necessary. 

The repeated declarations of our Presidents and Congress cer- 
tainly assure Hawaii that she has and would alw \vs ha 
moral support. But in the presence of and under this protection 
new conditions bring home to her the truth that this will no 
longer avail. By peaceful evolution or by war, if Hawaii is not 
annexed to the United States by the pending resolution, she will 
pass into tho possession of some foreign | ower, leaving as the 
alternative to us her loss or recovery at the cosl of an expensive 
war. 

The student of existing condition- can no) escape this conclu- 
sion. 

If we reject this resolution and the treaty pending, how can wo 
longer expect to maintain a protectorate over Hawaii? The pres- 
ent Government derives its force largely because it is ! 
3537 



14 

regarded as a step to annexation. Their present constitution is 
based upon annexation. If we reject annexation, the present 
authorities, to preserve their existence, their properties, consti- 
tuting three-fourths of that on the islands, nay, their very lives, 
will offer the Republic to some other country on the condition of 
the preservation of themselves, their properties, and political 
rights. What, then, becomes of our protectorate? Whom can 
we protect when no one asks our protection? Grant our inter- 
ference; does anyone dream that if the present Hawaiian Gov- 
ernment offered to annex Hawaii to Japan, we could prevent that 
consummation except by an expensive, prolonged, and possibly 
dreadful war? 

Or suppose no such offer is made, and we reject this treaty and 
resolution, and in due course of time Japan asserts the franchise 
right for her citizens in Hawaii, or that the natives qualify and 
vote; does anyone doubt that the then established Government, to 
secure its permanency, would turn to Japan or some other nation 
for support? 

Or grant that the Government remains the same in Hawaii and 
our moral support the same, and Spain demands indemnity against 
Hawaii for not remaining neutral in the present war, and presents 
claim for permitting us to coal and supply in her ports on the way 
to the Philippines, does anyone doubt that this would be a valid 
claim under the laws of nations and in amount would be so great 
as to extend Spanish suzerainty over Hawaii? Is not here a moral 
consideration on our part to annex in order to save that little Re- 
public the disaster her loyalty to our cause has imposed upon her? 

Or grant that no one of these occurrences comes to pass, but 
that, present conditions prevailing, we become involved in a war 
with Japan or some other nation of first-class power possessing a 
navy equal or superior to ours, unless we shall have previously 
annexed and fortified Hawaii, how long before Hawaii would be 
invested by the enemy, fortified, and made a base of supplies to 
harass our western coast and destroy our commerce? What 
would the moral force of a protectorate avail then? And how 
long would it require for us to dislodge an enemy here? Our re- 
cent experiences at Santiago and Havana should be instructive. 
The terror of citizens, abandonment of resorts and business upon 
our seaboards, the frantic clamor from the coasts, even the Pa- 
cific, should bear fresh witness of the disasters occasioned even 
by the remotest possibilities of coast attack. 

If a possibly rotten Spanish fleet at Cadiz terrorizes the Atlantic 
coast, what would be the condition of the public mind on the 
Pacific coast with a hostile Japanese fleet of first-class war ships, 
superior to ours, as she possesses, intrenched at Hawaii? I well 
remember that with the inferior Spanish fleet at Manila, guarded 
by the superior force of Dewey, when it was proposed to remove 
the Oregon and Mon lercy ; from the Pacific coast, a storm of pro- 
tests from these good citizens was showered upon the Navy De- 
partment and the delegation in Congress. The amount of damage 
to the Pacific coast and commerce consequent upon the occupancy 
of Hawaii by an enemy in time of war would be incalculable. 

This is not a speculative consideration. It is a reasonable prob- 
ability, and as such, while we are determining this matter, should 
be avoided absolutely, completely, and forever by the annexation 
of these islands. The fact that under an existing protectorate the 
President and Government of this Republic wish to surrender thei r 
high offices and are imploring us to receive their independent sov- 
3537 



15 

ereignty as a dependency outfit to demonstrate tho incompetency 
of Sat protectorate tomeel Inevitable conditions, and ought at 
the sain.- time to convince Congress thai animminenl danger con- 
fronts as wherenpon. it we do not act, there may bo lost to tins 
country an opportunity of defense rarely offered in tho life and 
situation of a nation. 

If wo fail to act in this emergency and upon this opportunity, 
where no other nati< d is protesting or will protest, at a tun.- when 

Hawaii is I Ing to be annexed, at a lime when the absolute 

necessity for these islands is demonstrated by their use by us in 
coaling and supplying our ships en route to tho Philippines ana in 
resting and refreshing our gallant soldiers thence bound, ii wo 
wait until the progressof time and the development oj conditi 
present obstacles to annexation, in myjudgmenl oneof thegrai 
blunders of the century will have been committed by the wisest 
nation of the century. 

The political status of the Hawaiian Government is unstable, 
A protectorate will not suffice: annexation alone is necessary to 
and will provide against all menacing contingencies upon our 
western coast. Therefore I conceive tho imperative duty of the 
hour to be annexation. . . , 

The manifest duty of tho hour to insure our defense in future 
wars to remove a source of complications in future i 
is to'annex these islands. So long as they remain under their 
present and similar governments they will ever be a menace b. the 
peace of this country by involving us in controversies over them. 
The solution and safety of the situation demand immediate an- 
nexation, 

ANNEXATION WILL lsr.NI'.l IT I. VnOR. 

It is charged by the opponents of annexation that such will in- 
iure the condition of the laborers of this country. '1 he meresug- 
•restionof this statement is sufficient to warrant consideration, 
for if found true it should under ordinary circumstances control 
in the matter. . , , 

\ ,rrect understanding of the elements and forces involved 
argues the converse, that annexation will benefit the labor Of this 
country. This phase of the question has been much befogged by 
a want of a clear understanding thereupon. Even so well in- 
formed a gentleman as Mr. Gompers. president oi the Ami r 
Federation of Labor, whom I deem and know personally to bean 
intelligent, honorable, and capable gentleman.has fallen into this 
crror.° In a letter addressed toSpeaker Rki Dafewdays since ho 

said: 

The laborers are corralled In gangs of from twelv. i each can* 

luivnVganoTOr " armed *»"* a whip with which diligtt 

U ^eoTerw&tognumoerofc<mtrae1 Z^£Eft£3ES"3S£ 

in the suttar Industry, an I r employers have ahva 'ii.it 

the sn-'ir" in.l 'iVtrv can a I oily o .nducted •• 

^sssssssssssa ■ « "--* ^ ■ ■ • snaa 

the United £ ' l ' ,c V ; ,in ; . ' '" 

KmiUvieh islands permitted to coi 

s^cieToflab^ repugnant to the fi "■•';':' 

M^ardawtost the extension of the same s] 

* r indu.trv of Louisianaand thecotton flel 
It n" V.irl'd more than twenty 3 Ution, 

and education ^legislatively close I he "nese. 

The wisdom of that legislation ha i b ■•■„ den intil there are few 

if any. who now „ : The annexati. w. mid. with 

one stroke of the pen,< " 

our gates, which would threaten an inundation of Hong liana to overwhelm 
tho free laborers of our country. 
3>37 



16 

The undesirable classes of inhabitants of these islands against 
whom criticism is leveled are the Chinese, Japanese, and Ha- 
waiians. 

So far as the Japanese residents are concerned, annexation will 
not change their status or rights. They can now enter these 
islands or the United States at will. 

So far as the Hawaiians are concerned, the same considerations 
apply. Annexation will not permit a single additional native or 
Japanese to enter this country. 

So far as the Chinese are concerned, the resolution contains a 
condition of annexation which not only prohibits the Chinese in 
Hawaii entering this country after annexation, but expressly 
prohibits any more Chinese entering Hawaii. The provision 
thereupon is: 

There shall be no further immigration of Chinese into the Hawaiian Is- 
lands, except upon such conditions as are now or may hereafter be allowed 
by the laws of the United States: and no Chinese, by reason of anything 
herein contained, shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Ha- 
waiian Islands. 

So that, inasmuch as the Chinese can and do go to Hawaii from 
China and establish factories there, sending much of their prod- 
ucts into this country free of duty under the existing reciprocity 
treaty, and as further emigration from China to Hawaii for that 
purpose will by annexation be prohibited, to that extent future 
competition by Chinese labor with our laborers will be stopped by 
annexation. 

And inasmuch as much, or in fact the vast bulk, of the products 
and manufactures of the Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, and na- 
tives in Hawaii are now admitted into this country by treaty free 
of duty, and thus thrown into competition with our laborers' 
products, annexation can not injure our laborers. 

But, as Mr. Gompers says, the vast majority of these are con- 
tract laborers and the sugar industry is run by them. Then, since 
this is true and this product of contract labor competes with a 
similar product of our laborers, coming in free of duty to our mar- 
kets, that is the very best reason for annexation, because, when 
we annex these islands, instead of the United States being gov- 
erned by their laws they will be governed by ours, one of which 
is that contract labor is unlawful. While this might not invali- 
date existing labor contracts, it would and certainly will prohibit 
new ones and mean the early extinction of contract labor in 
I lawaii. 

Tin; advantage of annexation to our laborers then will be the 
ultimate extinction of contract labor in Hawaii, which now com- 
petes in open market with our laborers. (The effect of this upon 
our beet-sugar industry I will speak of later.) To contend, as 
do( !fl Mr. ( iompers, that annexation will extend these local Hawaiian 
contract-labor laws to the United States is to contend that instead 
of annexing Hawaii, coming in under our laws, we are annexing 
the United States to Hawaii, going in under their laws. This is 
reductio ad absurdum. 

The experiences of mankind demonstrate that all inferior races 
decimate and become extinguished before the march of Anglo- 
Sa son civilization and laws. The annexation of Hawaii, with the 
Chinese exclusion condition quoted, means the extirpation from 
Hawaii of the Chinese, Japanese, and Hawaiians now competing 
in open market with our laborers. The invasion by Anglo-Saxons 
following annexation of these islands so guarantees. Since the 
enactment of the United States Chinese exclusion laws the num- 



17 



ber of < !hinese in this country has b en rapidly decreasing;. 
will be when cur exclusion laws are extended to Hawaii. 
pressly provided by these resolutions. Indeed, the resolutions 
are stronger, Cor under them no Chinese whatever can go to Ha- 
waii. The native! [awaiians have, in obedience to history, In past 
years been reduct d from half a million to 80,000. 

The following table shows the relative population of thi 
in 1890 and 1898: 

tfati ompared. 



i ality. 



Bawaiians 

Pari Bawaiians 

< ihinese 

Americana 

Bawaiian born, for- 
eign parent - 

Japanese 

Norwegian 






31,436 
6, 186 
15,30] 

1 828 

r. (96 

12 380 






31,019 

8,485 
21,616 



Nationality. 



Britoi - 

Porl oguese 

ins 

b 

t >ther foreigners 

• aian 












l 944 
419 



15,191 

101 
000 



89,990 



'Divided into nationality of parents. 

This table is instructive. It shows Japan's desire and attempl 
to populate these islands by a majority of her people, BO as to ac- 
quire th- 'in: it shows annexation will limit the number of th< 
elimination of tho possibility of accomplishing this purp 
shows that a great influx of Chinese will be Btopped; il shows 
that the natives are gradually becoming extinct. Increased Anglo- 
Saxon habitation will increase this, it shows, in short, that an- 
nexation will naturally diminish this alien competitive force of 
laborers— drive them out of these islam l>, where they hover under 
cover of the reciprocity treaty as competitors with our laborers. 

The impetus jjiven business by the insurance of a stable govern- 
ment by annexation will immediately populate these islands wi li 

such an influx of Americans that all other races musl go before 
them. The Japanese and the Chinese, as soon or before their three 
or five years labor contract expires, by necessity of law, will <le 

part : the native in due course of his destiny wilV become extinct : 

so that annexation means the annihilation in these islands of con- 
tract labor now competing with our laborers inopenmai 

benefit rather than an injury to our laborers. 

We should, if for no other reason, annex Hawaii so that by 
extending our contract-labor inhibiting laws thereto we can blol 
and drive from its Bhores the contract labor i »W competing with 
our laborers in open market. This alone, other, things being I QUal, 
would justify annexation. The- organized labor of the country 

realizes and appreciates this, as will be Been from the following: 

WA8HIKOT09 I 1 I 

Dear Sir: In reply to yonr Inquiry of even date i eelingof "or- 

ganized labor" on the question ot the annexation of Bawail, I 
state that my Individual opinion, base 1 on thirty-three years' ei 
wage-earner and twenty years among organized men, con to take 

". ;th Mr. t tempers, who was quoted as opposed to annexation 
< 'h wii- 1 i irk, "t Missouri, ■ In the House of B 

Saturday last. 

in this opinion Mr. Gkmipen should have l n 'in..to,i as an Individual and 

Dot as a representative of organized labor, and do man has authority 

thai organized labor is for <>r against annexation, foi Ion has never 

been placed before organized labor, 

Mr. Qompere himself, I am reliably informed, is a man of limited • 
ence as a wage-earner, ant does not correctly cihil''' tl • 
among American worktngmen, who desire to aphold in time of war Che Aa- 
;i>)7-2 



18 

ministration, regardless of their own political opinions, and he seems to ig- 
iK >re their oft-expressed desire to " extend commerce and multiply the oppor- 
tunities to labor." My belief is that Mr. Gornpers, on this question, stands 
almost alone, as I am informed he did at the last convention of his own or- 
ganization on the anti-Cuban war resolution. 
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 

A. M. LAWSON, 
Master Workman District Assembly 60, Washington, D. ft 

Hon. Charles H. Grosvenor, 

House of Re2>resen tatives. 

The Hotel Raleigh, Washington, D. ft, June 13, 1803. 

Dear Sir: In reply to your communication of the 11th instant concern- 
ing the position of organized labor on the annexation of Hawaii, permit me 
to state that I know of no labor organization, or any branch of it, which has 
taken any action on the matter. No doubt some members prominently 
identified with labor have expressed themselves on the subject one way or 
another as their individual opinions had led them, but the question has not 
received that consideration, to my knowledge, which the American work- 
man does and should give to matters bearing on his interests. 

Organized labor, in my opinion, should never be identified with partisan 
politics. We should at all times be free to strike an enemy or to assist a 
friend. In either case our memory should be good, irrespective of whatever 
his political party affiliations may be, for I hold that to advance the interests 
of organized labor is to advance the best interests of the state, and that is 
the first duty of every citizen worthy of the name. This is the school and 
the teaching which dominate the organizations which I have the honor to 
represent. . . 

As to tho annexation of Hawaii, which in no sense is a party issue, while it 
is true that we have not in any council or convention taken any position on 
the matter, it is also true that the sentiment of tho great mass of the mem- 
bership favor the proposition, as do many of their chief executive officers, as 
shown by the inclosed telegrams. This expression has become more pro- 
nounced as the apparent necessity grows since the brilliant victory of Manila. 
Such feelings are inspired by the same motives which prompted so many of 
our members to enter the volunteer service. 

It is not at all probable that in the event of annexation tho condition of 
labor in Hawaii would or could bo transplanted to this country, no more 
than the quasi serfdom of Mexico would find lodgment under our Constitu- 
tion, but, on the contrary, I submit there is every reason to believe that the 
advanced intelligence, conservatism, and patriotism of the organized Ameri- 
can workman would meet such conditions and vastly improve them. There 
are so many illustrations that it would bo idle to enumerate them. 

YoUI " S ' trUly ' W.F.HYNES. 

Representing Brotherhood Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood 
Locomotive Firemen, Order of Railway Conductors, Brother- 
hood of Raihvay Trainmen, Order of Railway Telegrapher*. 

Hon. C. n. Grosvexor, 

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. 

Montreal, Quebec, June v,, 1893. 
W. F. Htnes, "Raleigh Hotel, Washington, D. ft: 

As an American citizen, I am heartily in favor of the annexation of Hawaii. 

F. P. SAKGENT, 
Chief of Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 

Peoria, III., June Ht, 13Q3- 
W. F. HTNES, care ft Grosi-enor: 

Answering vour telegram, in my opinion tho United States should annex 
the Hawaiian islands. Tho necessity of our control over tho islands in time 
<it war is now apparent to everyone. Commercially, too, they are of great 
importance to us. „,._,,,,. „-,-,- 

P. H. MOEBISSET, 
Grand Master Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen. 

Cedar Rapids, Iowa, June U, 1898. 
V.' P Hvm;s. The Raleigh, Washington, D. ft: 

[n the position which it seems the United States must hereafter occupy, I 
deem Hawaii a very valuable, if not indispensable, acquisition. 

E. E. CLARK. 
Chief Order of Railway Conductors. 

3537 



LS 

it was observable and was of nole thai practically every one "f 
those members of this House who are to day opposing the annexe 
Hon of Hawaii recently voted againsl the consideration in this 
Honse of the Lodge immigration bill. If it is tins alleged incor- 
porating into our population of abonl 100,000 of 1 1 1 • - inhal 
of Hawaii claimed to be undesirable which actuates their oppo- 
sition, I conn ni >nd to them the Lodge immigration bill, for almost 
every sixty or ninety days there comes to this country a great r 
number of foreign immigrants than the whole population of 
Hawaii, all of whom compete more actively with our wage-earn- 
ers when heir than will the population Of Hawaii when an: 
This immigranl influx brings as no point of defense, no territory, 
no advantage as does annexation. 

If Congress wishes to serve the laborers of this country, let it 
annex I fawaii, thereby inhibiting run tract labor on the west, and 
shut down the gates of < Jastle Garden, thereby shutting out com- 
petition on the east. 

\ \ \ i . \ \ i 1 \ IND THE SUGAR-BEET 1NDU8TR1 IS \ M I i c I ■ \ . 

As the representative upon this floor of a distrid the soil and 
climate of large areas of which are admirably adapted to the de- 
velopment of the Bugar beet, which infant industry is rapidly 
being undertaken by many of my constituents, l have cone 
long and thoroughly this phase of the question. At first sugges- 
tion l was impressed with a danger to the interests of our Bugar- 
beet growers from annexation, but more mature consideration 
and study demonstrate to my mind thai we have nothing to fear 

in this direction. On the contrary, annexation will place the 
American farmer in a better position to compi te with the sugar 
producer of Hawaii. 

We are to bear in mind continuously that for years past and 
under present conditions the Bugar product of the Hawaiian is- 
lands has come and now comes into this country duty free. T. is 
condition would not, of course, be changed by annexation, yet 
under this condition the BUgar-beel industry of this country con- 
tinues to thrive and develop and has grown to what it is to-day. 

The only way these respective producers would be affected in a 

lethal wav" would be that at an early day the Hawaiian producer 

would be deprived of the use of cheap contract labor, \\' - 
the cost of production to him would lie enhanced and he propor- 
tionally injured so far as his ability to compete with our pro- 
ducer is concerned. 
( Mher conditions and facts bear upon their -elative situati 
it i^ a fundamental economic proposition pa ently bo true a- *,i 
i e idle to demonstrate, that where the demand is far in ex ■ 
Bupply tie -re is no competition between produ 

There is not at present any competition between the Hawaiian 
and American producers of Bugar, though they both sell in the 
same open market without any discriminating duty againsl the 

Hawaiian. 

This country annually Bends abroad $100, ,000 in pun fa 

BUgar consumed in this country in addition to that produ 

both this country and Hawaii. We annually consume over 2,1 .- 

000 tons of 2. '24(1 pounds each of sugar in this country, while the 
entire home and Hawaiian product for is:*:, the largest cv-r pro- 
duced, was but 528,000 tons. We. therefore, only prodn 
forth m both Hawaii and the United States of the BUgar we con- 
sume, and. therefore, there can be and is no present competition 



20 

between the home and Hawaiian sugar producer.' Hence the in- 
creased and increasing production of beet sugar in this country. 

The possibility that conditions will ever be otherwise is very 
remote, if not improbable. 

The American people are great sugar consumers. The records 
show that for the last twenty- three years the amount of sugar 
consumed each year in this country annually increased 12 per 
cent, and that by a most conservative estimate in fifteen years 
hence the American people will consume annually at least 4,000,- 
000 tons of sugar. 

With 84 per cent of our present consumption of sugar purchased 
abroad— that is, outside of Hawaii and thjs country— with the 
sugar demand increasing 12 per cent annually, it is absolutely 
impossible for this country and Hawaii for many years to come to 
supply this demand and thereby become competitors in our mar- 
kets. 

Some idea of the remoteness of this improbability may be had 
by the knowledge of the fact, as stated by Mr. Studniczka, whose 
words I will print, that an average-sized sugar factory producing 
3,500 tons of sugar per annum costs $350,000; that the number 
of such factories required to produce the quantity of sugar im- 
ported into this country in 1896 would be 506, costing $177,000,000. 
There are now only 7 of such factories in this country, where 506 
■would be required if we manufacture all the sugar we consume. 

Moreover, the annual increasing demand of 12 per cent per an- 
num of sugar consumed would require the additional construction 
annually of 42 sugar factories costing $14,700,000, or in ten years 
requiring 420 additional factories, at a cost of $147,000,000, to 
manufacture and supply the increased demand alone. In other 
words, for this country in 1903 to meet the domestic demand for 
sugar it must construct 92G sugar factories of an annual product of 
3,500 tons each, at a cost of $325,000,000, whereas at present, with 
the development of that industry, we have only 7. 

To contend that this will or can be done is to invade the bounds 
of absurdity; but unless it is and until it is done there will be no 
competition by Hawaiian beet-sugar growers with our beet-sugar 
growers. 

But while time is seeking to accomplish this miracle another 
factor enters for consideration. As each year rolls by the ability 
of the Hawaiian sugar producer to compete with us is being weak- 
ened if not destroyed. We have already attempted to show that 
the accomplishment of annexation will be a severe blow to both 
the Hawaiian sugar grower and manufacturer, for by this he w^ill 
be denied cheap contract labor. As these contracts only run for 
three and five years, in that time he will sustain a severe and, ac- 
cording to many, an irreparable blow, for his ability to produce 
sugar cheaply will be greatly diminished. He will be compelled 
as a competitor in our market to pay cost of transportation across 
the Pacific, which our farmer will not have to pay. 

By reason of the facts that the Hawaiian lands will not produce 
in alternate seasons other profitable products they are compelled to 
crop each year, thereby sooner exhausting their soils and requiring 
the additional cost item of high-priced fertilizers, estimated to 
aggregate in 1896 at least $700,000. 

The extreme acreage of Hawaiian sugar lands is already tilled 
for that purpose. These do not exceed 100,000 acres and coxild 
not be made to exceed 20,000 acres more except by very expensive 
cultivation. 
3537 



Jl 

Though hitherto no( developed, the Hawaiian lands are much 
better adapted to and can l»' more profitably farmed fori 
ami subtropical fruits, products which we consume, but do not 
produce. American enti rprise and capital in possession of these 
islands, under a Btable government as a guaranty of in 
will soon substitute these for the less profitable ragar products. 
< if this Secretary Wilson Bays: 

Hawaii, then, w mpete with sugar producers in the SI 

When ; he p< fth *cientil 

the possibilities of coffee pro Inction that can t»- extended over mnch of the 
limited Bngar I >* - 1 r . :t will be found that In that inda ionop 

oly with which no State In the Union can interfere, 
no scientific Improvement .•! the coffee tree w I 
the berry and Increased yield of the tree through Intelligent 

ever been made. 'I't limateof these Islands Isadmirablj adapted t.i th«> 

production ..i many fine fruits that can not be grown in any <-t our - 
They can grow many choice subtropical and tropical fruits that have 
the improvement ol which would lead I 
profitable production. In these directions the farmers ol tb< Stab 
qi i| a impete with Hawaii. 

To show thai the facte and figures offered are based up 
liable authority I here insert the opinions of the Secretary of 
culture, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. II. s. Studniczka's ; aator 

Morgan, tin' former being one of the best exj •■: ts of the day upon 
thie subject. Secretary Wilson say-: 

IMPORTATIONS Ol -i ■ 
The average amount ol sugar im)>..rt'-ii Into the Uniti Dually 

from 1890 to 1897, inclusive, \\. 

(101,575,383. The importation during the fiscal year ending June 10, IHS7, was 
than the average >•( 1 1 •• - four pn h was 

1 ,752 617 tons, owing to the desire of importers t of the 

tariff act pending in < '■ >n^i-.--i during the last months "t that j • 

The a v. ■raj,' 1 ' importation of sugar from the Hawaiian I slum is from 
1897, inclusive, was 1 19,456 tons, valued at - Pho importation for the 

fiscal year of 1895 was 192.608 tons being 43.053 ton above the average of the 

pr iding four years Durum 1897 the Hawaiian sugar was 9. 1 i»-r 

the amount consumed in the United 8 ta tea Prom l — "-■ : t . - 1807 il 

cent of our isumptton. 

. i.\-i kipnoa ot in ii bcoah 

The beet sugar consumed In the United States In 1808 v 
1891 it was 81 per cent, of the total consumption The disturbed eondit 
Cuba doubtle - caused much of this marked 
from countries In i ontinental Europe are those from whli ti we 
the mosi active competition. The production ol beet suimr In the I 

n ]-'.'", was 41,341 tons if 2,340 pounds each: o( rane augni 
ol maple sugar, 5,000 tons, and of sorghum sng i 

The total domestic product was :. 

The total refined product of imported sugai ogthe 

total annua! consumption 2,006.383 tons 

Prom the foregoing it appears that W percent I 
the United Btatea was Imported. 

ii v« mi vn sua vb i ii i us 

A prominent question Is, Can this Hawaiian prodm tionb 
in competition with the American farmer 1 Free entrv int.. the United 
from these islands has given great encouragemi duction ol 

and the industry has been developed very rapidly We must take int n 

Bideration methods of cultivation In Hawaii tx I Delude 

what the future of the industry will be In that 

Sugarcane is grown continuously on the same land in Hawaii, ami f..r 
this reason the soil is being exhausted. The ■ lied t.. 

buy commercial fertilizers. The three elements of plant food 
sary to vegetation are nitrogen, potassium, and phosphoric a I ! Ha 
will find saJtpeterin Chile, potash at the Stassfurl mine In Qermai 
phosphates in Florida. Guano on the islands ol I 

and & quite expensive. When it becomes necessary t i fertilize the soil in 
order to grow a crop, the expense becomes a considerable item and must In> 
considered in determining what th>' eff< 
American sugar growers 
; 537 



22 

HAWAII CAN NOT COMPETE. 

These considerations lead me to conclude that the system of agriculture 
pursued in Hawaii, which is certainly reducing the fertility of the soil, can 
not compete with a system of farm management in the United States, where 
the fertility of the soil is not at all reduced. Weconsume in the United States 
about 2,000,000 tons of sugar. Something like a million acres devoted to this 
purpose would produce all the sugar we import into our country at the pres- 
ent time, or 10 acres grown on each one of 100,000 farms, in rotation with other 
crops, would meet home demands and do no injury to the soils. 

The American farmer will use this crop to diversify the farm system. 
The Hawaiian sugar grower is a ono-crop man, and whenever one crop is 
perpetually grown, be it wheat or maize, oeets or cane, cotton or tobacco, 
the available plant food in the soil is certain to be reduced below the point of 
profitable production and fertilizers are required. 

Mr. Studniczka in a recent letter states: 

As one of your fellow-citizens and a resident of the city of St. Louis since 
1ST-, I desire to address you these few lines on behalf of the annexation of 
the Hawaiian Islands. 

Prior to coming to St. Louis I had been engaged in the beet-sugar indus- 
try of Austria. Then I superintended large sugar refineries here, and for 
the past twenty years my business has been that of manufacturing and sell- 
ing sugar-cane "fertilizers and dealing in all kinds of sugar machinery, in ad- 
dition to the construction of sugar and glucose manufactories. * * * 

All of my business interests are directly with the sugar and glucose pro- 
ducers of this country. I have no business relations with Hawaii or tho Ha- 
waiian sugar plantations and expect to have none. I am most intensely 
interested in the success of the beet-sugar industry of the United States, 
first, because I believe that it will be beneficial to my own business interests, 
and, second, because I believe it will be beneficial to this country as a whole, 
especially to the laboring interests. As evidence of my interest in this sub- 
ject, I have written much and often concerning the beet-sugar industry, urg- 
ing that measures be adopted to promote its establishment in this country. 
As a delegate to the last trans-Mississippi congress, held in July, 1887, at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, I presented to the congress an address upon the beet-sugar 
industry of this country, which is printed in their proceedings. 

I make this preliminary statement in order that it may demonstrate to you 
that all of my personal interests aro to aid and support the beet-sugar indus- 
try and the promotion of the domestic production of sugar in general. 
******* 

I have noted with surprise that one of tho principal reasons which appear 
to l>e urged against annexation is that it will injure the beet-sugar industry 
in the United States, and have therefore made investigation as to the facts 
and conditions in and concerning Hawaii, with a view to deciding in my own 
mind whether this objection were valid. As a result of my investigations, I 
was unhesitatingly convinced that the annexation of Hawaii will not be in 
any way injurious to either the domestic cane or beet sugar of this country. 

SUGAR CONSUMPTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 

The United States Government records show that the United States con- 
sumed during 1898 2,263,000 tons of sugar of 2,000 pounds each. Of this amount 
269,000 tons were produced from cane grown in tho United States and 44,500 
tons from beets produced in the United States, and 170.000 tons were produced 
in Hawaii. Hawaii and ttie United States together therefore produced only 
(89,000 tuns, requiring 1,773,000 tons to be imported from other countries. 

The official statistics of tho United States Government show that for 
twenty-three years the average annual increase of sugar consumed in the 
United Statesnas been 12 per cent over that of the previous year. Even in 
tmparatively dull times the increased consumption for 1897 over that 
of 1896 was 136,000 tons. It is estimated by Mr. Willett, of Willett & Gray, 
sugar brokers of Now York, one of the best-informed and most conservative 
sugar authorities of tho world, that tho consumption of sugar in the United 
States within fifteen years from now will not be less than 4,000,000 tons per 
annum. I considor this an entirely safe and conservative estimate. 

LIMIT OF HAWAIIAN SUGAR PRODUCTION. 

I ha ve made myself familiar with the facts and figures concerning Hawaiian 
production of sugar. For twenty three years Hawaii has had a free and pro- 
tected market in the United States for its raw sugar. Under this stimulat- 
ing influence practically all of its lands available for cane culture have been 
brought into cultivation. The total area so in cultivation is less than 100,000 
acres. A few thousand more acres can possibly be brought under cultivation 
l>v pumping water to an elevation of from 150 to SIX) feet. 

Even the area which this very expensive; cultivation can bring into use is 
limited, not to exceed from 15,000 to 20,000 acres. Tho largest amount of 
8537 



sugar ever produced In Hawaii In one year was a boa I 2-KUioi) tons. Th< 

est amount thai M ever can produce will probably i 

tons. The area available for cane culture In Hawa 

quires almost continuous cultivation, which is extremelj oxbaustini 

soil. 

The present pri duction of Hawaii is possible only by reason of th< 
enormous amounts i f high-grade and expeni 
Hawaii imported during 1896 fertilizers to the amount o( neurlj • 
Bides which there were used of domestic fertilizers about the same n 

As they nave > rop which they can rotate with cane, the exhaustion of the 

soil steadily continues, and can only be kept up bj Increasing 
Ization we can, therefore, be certain th:it the Hawaiian 
tion wiU be about 800,000 tons of sugar per annum. 

FUTURE 01 BEET SUGAR IN THIS COUNTRY 

The beei sugar Industry can. l firmly believe, be developed until 
furnish all the sugar which this country requires; but it will 
years to accomplish this. Some idea ol what will have 1 i be done before do- 
mestic beet Bugar can supply this country with all thesugar II consumes 
can be derived From the following figures: An average sized l* 
tory, producing 3,500 tons of Bugar per annum, will cosi - ■ ■> It 

would have required 506 1 1 sugar factories, costing 

the sugar imported into this country in 1896 from countries other than li 

Ii the annual increase In consumption of the United States Isoi 
150,000 tons per annum, in --trail of I2per cent, as it has been (or twentj 
yearopast. It would require each year IS additional factories, < >stii 
year $14,700,000, or within ten years from now it would require I ! 
factories, costing $147,000,000, to supply the Increase In consumption alone. 

That i« to say. by 1908 it will require, In round numbei 
factories, each capable of an annual product of 3,500 tons, cost! ui - 
to supply the Bugar, which will otherwise be imported from some othci 
try to supply the needs of the United States. There are now onlj 
sugar factories in operation in the United States. 

Even though the nigheet expectations of the friends of l t sugar are re 

alized, do they believe that 1,000 beei sugar factories will Ixj • -• 
this country within the next ten years) Until thedoi sugar indus- 

try is able to Bupply the market of the United States the sugar from Haw ail 
can not injure the beet sugar producers of the United Stal there 

will be an ansupplied market, with the price fixed by the pri 
throughout the world. The only way In which the domestic beet sugar pro 
ducercan be injured by Hawaiian sugar is that the Hawaiian producer 
undersell him. But the Hawaiian planter will not sell his sugar below tic 
market price unless there is some reason for so d ling, and thei 
reason so long as there is a market in which both he ana the American] 
will be protected by the American tariff. 

Therefore neither Hawaiian nor domestic United Stal n ill '* 

obliged to lower their prices in order to obtain ■ market. 

so l iikmt.h IN HAWAII THAN B 

The beet-sugar producers of this country do no! consider II 
planters of Louisiana a menace to their Industry why should th 
the Bugar raised in Hawaii a menace to them • If Hawaii lerlcan 

territory, the cane Bugarof Louisiana and ti ane Bugarof Hawaii will both 

stand in the same relation to the beet-sugar product 

to produce a limited amount, while the great field f-r. cpansion will i • 

1 >i.-d by the b »t sugar industry, with opportunity to.-. >an.l foi 

to conic far more rapidly than capital ms 1 1 k • ■ 1 >- to be I 

With every pern inal reast »n to op p os e Hawaiian annexation. II 
fad be Injurious to the domestic sugar business of the Unlt< 
im,' at the question from a purely selfish aspect, I can seen 
i ng that the annexation ol Hawaii will In any manner whatsoever Injun 
the beet or the cane BUgar Industry of the Un I while then 

every reason to believe that it will be beneficial to every b 
country. As a broad measure of national policy, and a- an American 
I sincerely hope that your honorable body wl dl claims tl 

Bona! Interests may bring before you against the annexation . ■ 

keep in mind only the ureal strategic advantage to our nation and 

and that the annexation of Hawaii may be Consummated at an I any date 

So that a critical examination of all the facts discloses that the 
Hawaiian sugar producer is nol to-day a competitor with the 
American sugar producer; that it will require years, if ever, for 
him to become such; that when this would become p 
tance to markets, the increased cost of his labor, the d< I 
3637 



24 

of his soils, and the limits of his acreage would, if he continued 
in business, practically eliminate him as a competitor; while 
every reason indicates that long before then these disadvantages 
and coexistent advantages will have diverted his efforts into an- 
other field of production, not, possibly, competitive with us, and 
he will have entirely surrendered the sugar-producing field to our 
farmers. Inasmuch as, therefore, annexation will not possibly 
disadvantage our sugar producers now selling in open market 
their sugar products with the Hawaiians, but will be a great 
factor in reducing the competitive strength of the Hawaiian pro- 
ducer in this respect and turn his efforts to another field of pro- 
duction, I say annexation will be a benefit and not an injury to 
the American beet-sugar industry. 

THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION. 

The Congressional records of a hundred years past, covering 
all the glorious epochs marking the expansion of the confines of 
this Republic from the thirteen original States to the present 
broad expanse, witnesses the same learned disquisitions upon con- 
stitutional law, the same declamations upon ' ' imperialism "having 
been expounded in Congress in opposition to each of the steps of 
our nation to the present territorial limits. Yet no member here 
to-day would undo any of these acts. It is a poor commentary 
upon the wisdom of the fathers to assert that there was denied 
this sovereignty in its charter of creation, the power to adjust itself 
to inevitable growth, population, and welfare. 

From my limited point of view this question seems foreclosed 
not only by the express words of the Constitution, but by the de- 
cisions of the Supreme Court thereupon and the recognized policy 
of over a century. 

Section 8, Article I of the Constitution of the United States 
says: 

The Congress shall have power to * * * provide for tho common de- 
fense and general welfare of the United States. 

That the annexation of these islands is necessary both for the 
common defense and to promote the general welfare, I have 
already endeavored to show. 

So the powers granted Congress to "make treaties" and to 
" declare war " have likewise been held sufficient to warrant the 
acquisition of territory whenever the same was incident to the 
subject-matter thereof. 

The Constitution nowhere expressly authorizes or prohibits 
Congress acquiring territory, but since the full and complete exer- 
cise of the powers expressly granted Congress above cited at 
times necessarily require the acquisition of territory, these neces- 
sary powers must by all rules of construction be deemed included 
in the grants named. 

Nor is Congress limited to any particular procedure, as by treaty 
or joint resolution, in its exercise of the power providing for the 
general defense. This is so vital a power to the existence of the 
sovereignty itself that the framers of the Constitution evidently 
did not appreciate the high national importance of marking this 
distinction. 

That with the express grant of power in the Constitution is 
included the incidental power of acquiring territory when neces- 
sary has been often decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 

3o37 



25 

In one of these opinions Chief Justice Marshall, sp 

the court, says: 

The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government o( theUi 
power of making wars and making treaties; consequently the Qovernment 
-sc6 the power <>t acquiring territory >■:; her bj * treaty. 

That opinion was rendered in the great case of the American 
Insurance Company vs. Canter. 
And again, in the celebrated case of Mormon Church ra. The 

United States, the same court B 

The power to acquire territory is derived From the treaty TaMng power 
and. the power to declare and carry oo war. * • * The incidents ol these 
powers are those of national sovereignty ;ni<l belong to M Independent nov 
ernments. 

There can be no question, then, that when the acquisition of 
territory is necessary to '"the common defense " or to "promote 
the general welfare*' that the incidental power is granted. 

To deny this power now is to reopen tho settled debah 
policy of this Government for over one hundred years. The < Jon- 
stitution confers plenary powers for this purpose, and whether 
their exercise shall he by treaty or resolution affects and is af- 
fected by the exigencies of the occasion only and in nowise 
tives the existence of this power fundamental to sovereign exist 
ence. 

The exercise of this power at intervals for over a hundred years 
has grown up with the nation and developed one of 
policies and prerogatives as sacred as the written Constitution 
itself. Through it the area of the country has expanded from 
800,000 to 3,000,000 square miles. Through it we have extended 
our confines from Ohio to and including Alaska, 1,500 mill 
tant overland to the north, and tho Aleutian Island-. 500 miles 
West of Hawaii. Through it, step by step, we acquired Louisiana 
in 1803, Florida in 1819, California, New Mexico, and Arizona in 
1840, and Alaska in 1867. Sometimes by treaty, suuietimee by 
resolution, always for the general welfare and fox the common 
defense; and no one here will deny, though it was then denied, 
that each of these steps did add to the "coma a ' and 

promote the '"general welfare." 

So as the confines of our country have b en gradually extends 1 
westward, occupying step by step every vantage an enemy might 
occupy, we are now not inaugurating a new policy or exer 
a new* power in annexing Hawaii, but exercising i written, 
dicated, often exercised constitutiona] powi r in tl ruina- 

tion" of a policy of our country pursued for over a century 
which no man will deny has |£ each case added to tb 
defense and promoted the general welfare, and which no man will 
in the future deny was so and well done in this c 

I take it that the broad powers of providing for the "common 
defense" and "promoting the general welfai 
by our Constitution were intended to embrace in a • 
those inherent powers of every independei pity to do 

every act necessary to preserve the independent existence of that 
sovereignty or which will promote the weal, development, and 
well-being of it and its peopla So reading our Constitution, I 
believe that in voting for the annexation of Hawaii [ ai 
the oath taken upon assuming a seat in this House to support that 
Constitution of the United States of America. 
3537 



2t> 



EDUCATION IN II AAV All. 

One of the frequent objections urged to annexation is the state- 
ment that the Hawaiians are a "mixed, mongrel, ignorant race.*' 
This is not only inconsistent, but without foundation in fact. 

We are 75,000,000, they 109,000. If all of them were ignorant, 
their precipitation in our midst would only result in their enlight- 
enment and not our retrogression. I have already stated that often 
at intervals of sixty or ninety days an equal number of ignorant 
are thrust upon us from European ports, and have not lowered 
our standard of intelligence or morality, though they do injure 
our laborers by competing with them in our labor markets. 

If it is true that the Hawaiians are so ignorant, we should annex 
at once, upon the reasoning of the minority— for they here con- 
tend for a protectorate over these people, and it is admitted our 
Government is committed to and now maintains that quasi re- 
sponsibility for their conduct, and I insist that if we are to be re- 
sponsible for their national conduct in the probable complications 
of the twentieth century we should have a right to control their 
acts. This would be necessary that we prevent being led into 
international controversies by them. Here annexation would 
prevent such rather than complicate us with other nations. 

But the intelligence of a people has never been so recklessly 
mistaken or misstated as that of the Hawaiians. It seems we are 
accustomed to assume their ignorance, when, in fact, man for 
man, they are as well educated as almost any people on the globe. 
Indeed, their standard of education compares well with that of 
any State of the Union. Almost every adult Hawaiian can read, 
write, and speak the English language. That is the language 
taught in their schools. About one-half of the Portuguese on these 
islands are equally as well educated. The remarkable showing 
is made that their laws require compulsory education, and that 
of 14,286 eligibles, 14,023 children actually attended school in 1896. 
Their school system compares favorably with any of the world, 
as shown by the following table: 



Number o 


f schools 


teachers, and pupils fot 


the yea 


• 1896. 




Schools. 


Teachers. 


Pupils. 




Male. 


Female. 


Total. 


Male. 


Female. . Tutal. 


Government 

Independent 


132 
03 


Ill 
72 


169 
130 


280 
202 


5, 754 
1,994 


4.435 10,189 
1,840 ] 3,834 


Total 


195 


183 


299 


482 1 7,748 


6,275 I 14,023 



Annexation, therefore, would not bring us a mongrel, ignorant 
race, but a race whose standard of education is good, and among 
whom is already established schoolhouses and a school system 
rarely excelled. 

If. however, these islands are necessary to our defense and wel- 
fare, why should this great nation shrink from its duty on account 
of 109,000 ignorant people, be it granted? I am one who has more 
confidence in the moral and educational forces of my country. 
Annex, provide for our defense and welfare, and if elevation is 
there needed this great nation is equipped with the necessary 
forces to educate and moralize the acquired. 

Indeed, we are fortunate to be able to acquire so valuable an 
outpost for the national defense by having to assimilate so few of 
3537 



objectionable population. We find here ■ government 
upon ours, a pcoplo whoso language and institution* 
whoso laws are ours, whoso schools teach <>nr language, whose 
sentiments and patriotism respect and hold holy the holidays of 
our country— a more assimilative country could rarely be found. 

OOSTXOtn i ^ . 

"Two thousand miles away "is a phrase which seems always 
to delight the opponent of annexation, lie loves to roll these 
words about his tongue and his tongue aboul them. Bui nal 
contiguity is measured by hours and not by miles. In considering 
the ad vantages and movements of the commerce, of the militia, 
and of the great navies of the world, miles are no Ion 
ered, but the hours measuring these movements are tb 
sideration. The presence of c ur re n ts, of winds, oj .•_.■ rail, 

of relative motive powers, compel this. 

Within this rule Hawaii is far within the precedents. She is 
nearer Washington than was the Dearest borders of Louisiana in 
1803, than was Florida in 1810, California in 1849, or Alaska in 
1867 or to-day. she is nearer Washington in miles to-day than 
portions of Alaska, than the Aleutian Islands, and the Btudway 
Islands, hundreds of miles west of Hawaii, owned by us and at- 
tempted to be made a naval station by OS with the loss of $o 
expended and a war ship wrecked. 

{ -on -i.n i OJ • i ii | UfinLCJBD I mi v in . w r- 

It is insisted that we have no moral right to annex, and that it 
is not in conformity with the high prin ciples of this Government 
to extend its dominion without consenl of those al 

The absurdity of this proposition as an abstraet one is shown 
by history. This has never been the practice excepting in tie 
of Texas. We did not consult the Indians of Florida; we con- 
suited only the g o ver n ing power, Spain. We .lid not consult the 
Indians of Louisiana; we consulted only the governing power, 

France. Wo did not consult the half-breeds of California; we 

consulted only the governing power, Mexico. We did not consult 
the Eskimos of Alaska; we consulted only the governing ; 
Russia. 

So with Hawaii it is sufficient to consult the Republic authori- 
ties, the recognized governing power, and not th-> Chinese and 
Japanese, the latter having been sent there to pr nible, 

annexation. That this is the desire of the Bawaiians outst li 
few interested royalists is attested by the fact that resolntii i 
voring annexation were unanimously adopted bt their 
Representatives, a large majority 0$ whom and the 
which were and are fufi-blooded Hawaiian--. 

Thus it appears that while our friends insist this 
be first submitted to s popular vote of those whom tl 
to be mongrels and ignorant, [submit this is neither the • 
lished practice, nor is it necessary in the present easel 
the popular will of those entitle.) to be COttse 

Granting that we are farcing upon these - i called igm rai 
Government, can anyone conceive of a gn 
forced upon any nation? When ti 

ernment those liberty-preserving principles for which mankind 
has fought since creation and which are tie- envy of all en 
nations, to force upon these so called mongrels these benign prin- 
ciples and this magnificent Government, insuring th-m our lib- 

o337 



28 

erty, protecting them with our powers, is certainly a spectacle and 
a crime which must strike dumb with awe the whole world. 

It can only be compared with that inhuman cruelty which 
prompts a good mother to punish her babe with a dose of castor 
oil, seemingly useless, cruel, barbarous at the time, but possibly 
the child will be spared long enough to learn that it was that 
which spared his life and preserved his health and to appreciate 
that after all there is no one like a mother. 

ANNEXATION IS THE DEMOCRATIC TOLICY. 

The nineteenth century opened with Thomas Jefferson, the 
founder of Democracy, founding the areal basis of this great Re- 
public by the annexation of Louisiana in 1803. Following in his 
illustrious footsteps and blazing the forests in the same direction 
in pursuit of the policy of annexation were James Monroe, a Dem- 
ocrat, who in 181!) annexed Florida; James K. Polk, a Democrat, 
who in 1845 annexed Texas and in 1819 annexed California; Frank- 
lin Pierce, a Democrat, who in 1853 made the Gadsden purchase. 

Alaska alone of all the great annexed domain of this country 
came in under other than Democratic administration, a policy 
which has increased the area of the Republic from 815,615 square 
miles to over 3,600,000 square miles, and now we are told that the 
further annexation of 6,000 square miles in Hawaii is not a Demo- 
cratic policy and that this means national destruction. The 
Democratic party has made mistakes and accomplished good, has 
suffered defeats and gained successes, but the grandest of all its 
achievements and greatest glory of that party is that it has founded 
the areal basis of the greatest of republics. History has insepara- 
bly linked with Democracy the laying of the structural founda- 
tion of this great country. 

The past century has dedicated to the cause of mankind through 
the Democratic policy this broad and expansive area. Its incep- 
tion was marked and the policy founded at the commencement of 
the century by Jefferson. God forbid that this policy shall be 
impeded at the close of this century by the party founded by Jef- 
ferson. The annexation of Hawaii means the consummation of 
that policy, and it is fitting that it should be completed at the 
close of the century at the commencement of which it was inaugu- 
rated. Let the nineteenth century witness the consummation of 
this great work by the acquisition of the last necessary piece of 
territory which makes a boundless ocean the natural defender 
of the great work of a century of glorious Democratic policy. 

COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF HAWAII. 

While the United States generally is benefited by the trade 
with Hawaii, California is particularly so. The following is a 
statement of San Francisco\s commerce alone, showing Hawaii 
her second best customer, for the year ending November 30, 1896: 
Tabh showing comparative importance of San Francisco export^ to Haivaii, 
mid to sonu other countries, for the year ending November SO, 1896. 

Australia... ^'P'9S9 

Bawaii 3,588,000 

All of Central America • :i,44o.(KKl 

China :.'.!Wi,(kK) 

Japan 2,270,000 

Mexico - 1,469,000 

All Europe, except Great Britain 1 . 4 ir>. (MHt 

All of Asia ami Oceanica, except China and Japan 1,298,000 

New Zealand. Samoa, Marquesas, Cook, Fiji, Friendly, Marshall, 

i laroline, and all other Polynesian islands combined i,8I.(hH) 

British Columbia iSl'rJS 

All of South America jmaum 

3537 



29 

Hawaii ia San Francisco's second host foreign wine customer, 
her third best purchaser of salmon, her third largest consumer 

of barley, and her sixth best consumer of Hour. In 1896 Hawaii 
imported 76 per oent of her imports, aggregating f5, 164,808, from 
the United States. 

Under existing conditions Hawaii lias here a free market for 
but practically three of her products— su urar, rice, and bananas. 
Her general tariff of 10 per cent lias allowed about 85 per cent of 
her imports to come from other countries than the United States. 
If we annex, this restriction will be removed as to us and we will 
surround her with our tariff Of over 50 per cent against the world, 
which will give us all her trade. 

If we do not annex and some other country does, our trade will 
be cut off entirely by a similar tariff to ours thrown around 
Hawaii by the annexing country. Our merchants, manufactur- 
ers, and producers of California, walled off from the East by 
mountain ranges and exorbitant railroad rates, have found in 
Hawaii a good customer. We sell her our wines, flour, hay, liar- 
ley, and many other products. This with only 109,000 population. 

Annex. and our trade will be multiplied many fold, besides selling 
her the 25 percent now purchased by her from other countries. 
This means an increased demand for the products of our Cali- 
fornia farmer and merchant. It means the employment of more 
labor by them to meet thi- increased demand ana higher wages 
for the laborer. 

Refuse to annex and permit some other country to do so, and 
we lose the greater part, if not all, of our existing trad" with 
Hawaii. Hawaiian trade brings many millions of dollars to the 
San Francisco merchants each year. 'Locally speaking, my con- 
stituents whose markets are in San Prancisco profit much by this, 
for the more demand there is of the San Francisco merchant, the 
more money paid to him. the more demand be has for my con- 
stituents 1 produce and the more money to pay for it. Annexa- 
tion, therefore, means f<>r my constituents moro demand for their 
products, more money to pay for them, .and a consequent greater 
demand by them for more labor and higher prices for the Bame. 

The foreign trade of Hawaii is already phenomenal. In l s '.»r, it 
amounted to $308 per capita for each man, woman, and child in 
that country, a record unparallele I in history. The total number 
of American vessels entering American ports in theyear ending 

dune 30, 1898, were l v '-'. and of these t91 were from Hawaii: that 

is, Hawaii furnished cargoes for 191 American ships, while all the 
world besidet furnished cargoes for only 298 such. ! fter ai 
tion all Hawaiian trade must under the law be carried in Ameri- 
can bottoms, for this then coast trad". As our tariff will 
bar out trade between other countries and Hawaii and turn the 

Hawaiian trade to this country, alter annexation all Hav 
commerce will be carried In American ships, the number of which 
will soon be doubled, all to the immense advantage of this coun- 
try, and California in particular. 

Be the population of Hawaii what it may, it is today ti 
commercial country for its size and the number of its population 
on the globe, and is in the • customer ol tl 

cific coast. Why should we of the coast, then, fling aside the 
golden opportunity to secure more firmly this customer, if not 
prevent its absolute loss to our country.- We need not speculate 
upon future possibilities, but I rest my case up>n the proposition 



30 

that annexation of Hawaii is vital to the prosperity of the Stateof 
California. 

THE NICARAGUA CANAL. 

Inseparably connected with the annexation of Hawaii as a mili- 
tary and commercial outpost is the construction of the Nicaragua 
Canal. This should he done and owned by the United States 
Government, and no other party or power. No enterprise of 
modern times will work the results which will be accomplished 
by the construction of this canal. High freight rates between 
East and West will be matters of the past. The Atlantic and 
Pacific States will be 10,000 miles nearer. European markets will 
be 7,000 miles nearer California, and the Orient will be 6,000 
miles nearer New York. It doubles the effectiveness of our Navy 
by enabling the Atlantic squadron to defend the Pacific, and that 
of the Pacific to defend the Atlantic. 

With the Nicaragua Canal and the "Keyof the Pacific,"' Hawaii, 
as naval and commercial agencies of the United States, the do- 
minion, commerce, and safety of our Government are secured. 
With these we can marshal our armies and exploit our navies 
from Occident to Orient far more rapidly than any other power 
on the face of the globe. With these we can control and direct 
the commerce of the two hemispheres; we can successfully pro- 
ject our commerce into the great regions of Siberia, China, and 
the Oceanic isles as well vend it at the doors of Europe. 

NOT IMPERIALISM. 

It is unfortunate that the consideration of this question is made 
necessary at the present time. The glorious victory of the gallant 
Dewey at the Philippines and his occupation there have led the 
opponents of the annexation of Hawaii to level against the latter 
arguments entirely addressed to the question of annexing the 
former. We have introduced here frequently the words "im- 
perialism," "national aggrandizement," "land grabbers," and 
other similar terms. It is only one more evidence of the weak- 
ness of the case of the opponents of annexation of Hawaii when 
they inveigh here such entirely superfluous and irrelevant consid- 
erations. The absence of a capacity to discriminate is always 
unfortunate. 

The annexation of Hawaii involves not the first elements of im- 
perialism. On the contrary, if it is anything, it is the consum- 
mation of consolidation and concentration. It involves only and 
is for the national defense and welfare, the preservation intact of 
existing compact territory, and the promotion of the welfare 
thereof alone. It is for consolidation, not extension. It is but the 
consummation of a century's great work and policy marked out 
by Jefferson, pursued by Pierce, Polk, and other eminent Demo- 
crats, in rendering impregnable by natural fortifications this great 
Republic and promoting the welfare thereof. 

One of the essential elements of colonization and imperialism is 
the gathering in as dependencies countries of different tongues, 
habits, laws, and institutions. That is wanting here, for, as I have 
already said, the Hawaiians speak our tongue, teach our language 
in their schools, imitate our laws, copy our institutions, celebrate 
our holidays. They are already Americanized and assimilated. 

Independent of the existence of the present war and the exigen- 
cies thereof, I find cogent reasons confirming the conviction of the 
necessity for annexing Hawaii. 

35:)7* 



31 

The war has served only to emphasize and confirm this conclu- 
sion. It has unexpectedly and incomparably in ;i moment Mashed 
before the world a situation in the Philippines where the proper 
conduct of the war. the proper succor of onr Navy and Army, and 
the comfort and health of many of onr soldier neighbors en route 
to serve our country imperatively require that we control Hawaii. 

I have voted to declare this war, I have voted to bring on the 
conditions at the Philippines, I have voted to intrust our nation's 
honor and vindication in the hands of our present President, and 
having so done, and he having declared annexation necessary 
thereto, I shall vote therefor to uphold his hands in this crisis, be- 
ing convinced as I am that it is entirely necessary and fur the 
best interests of the Republic. 

I do not consider any question of foreign policy is here involved, 
but solely a question of the nation's defense, welfare, and present 
military necessity. 

Even were a question of foreign policy here involved, I would 
deem it unwise tor any Representative "or party to adopt at this 
time a fixed policy with reference thereto. War is an extraordi- 
nary occasion which brings to nations extraordinary duties and 
the necessity of the exercise of varied functions and acts. Partic- 
ularly is this trne of a nation's foreign policv in time of war with 
a foreign power. It can not with reference to snch war and the 
opposing nation Bafely adopt any fixed territorial policy, and all 
fixed policies should be excepted in case of war. 

The great means to success in war are by destroying the enemy's 
army and navy, demolishing her cities, exhausting hex revenues. 
and conquering and occupying her territory. 

If the enemy be a foreign power and we announce in advanc • 
that we will not acquire foreign territory, we waive in advance 
and deny ourselves one of the most successful means to a success- 
ful conclusion of the war. Theenemv should know that we mean 
not only to invade her territory, but hold it if n< cessity demands, 
that tear of this loss may induce peace. 

War always carries the successful belligerent beyond original 
demands. At the inception of this war our I tovernnient, in the 
interest of peace and in harmony with its definite purpose 1 
tablish liberty in Cuba peacefully, if possible, but by war it 
essary, announced in its declaration of war which was mad.' and 
sent to Spain as an ultimatum that ( luban independence was all 
we desired, and expressly negatived the idea of desiring to acquire 
any of Spain's territory. 

This was contemptuously refused; was nor even received, much 
less considered, by that country. That being the case, our atti- 
tude now and Spain's expectations must be that we shall pursue 

through war. vigilantly availing ourselves of all the r 
nized means thereto, including the acquisition of Spanish I 
toiyand possessions. This accords with every war by civilized 
nations. < >ur forefathers in the war of the Revolution demanded 
only certain concessions as to taxes, etc.; but. war being i 
sary thereto, they demanded and secured the legitimate rose 
the situation eventuated by that war— indep 

In this war and at this tiin • territorial policies of this (Govern- 
ment should not be mooted. Spain should know that to sue 
fully prosecute this war we will conquer and hold, if •. 
not only the Philippines. Cuba. Puerto Rico, nay, even Spain her- 
self. That we will invade these and .-trip her of every vestige of 



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32 

territory. Any other policy denies us the most potent means to 
successful war. - 

It will be early enough for us to discuss whether we will Imld 
any or all of these after the great and paramount object of the 
hour is accomplished— the suit for peace by Spain— until which no 
avenue of success should be abandoned or its abandonment, dis- 
cussed. When the treaty of peace is to be signed and indemnity 
paid us, these possessions— commercial outposts and naval stations 
therein, always desirable— can be mooted and determined. Until 
then let us, as a united people, demand of the President, as Com- 
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy, aggressive war, and up- 
hold his hands in all he requires to that end. 

Let us remember that the supreme duty of the hour is the 
vindication of American honor stained by the great insult of a 
contemptible power and the upholding the cause of liberty to which 
this Republic is dedicated; let us pray that we will come forth a 
united, peaceful, happy, and God-fearing people; let us hope that 
out of the ranks of war, out of the smoke and din of battle, out 
of the rejoicings over victories by land and by sea our nation will 
emerge and then wisely meet all questions of future policy, do- 
mestic and foreign, and solve them wisely and properly as becomes 
the stability and future of a Republic founded upon the intelli- 
gence of its citizens and dedicated to the cause of freedom. 

3537 



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